As the Co-Chair of the Bali process, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted both the Coordination Meeting and the Preparatory Meeting of Bali II. The purpose of both meetings was to review the work to date of both Ad Hoc Experts Groups (AHEG1 and AHEG2) and to prepare the agenda for Bali II.

The Coordination Meeting was an informal – steering group type - setting and a rather small gathering, which included both Co-Chairs (Indonesia and Australia), the Coordinator of the AHEG1 on Strengthening Regional and International Cooperation (New Zealand), the Coordinator of the AHEG2 on Cooperation of Law Enforcement Agencies and on Adopting and Strengthening Legislation to Combat Transnational Crimes (Thailand), delegations from Australia and Indonesia, the APC Co-ordinator, IOM and UNHCR.

The Preparatory Meeting was more formal and open to all the participants and observers in the Bali process. UNHCR was represented in both meetings by Michel Gabaudan, Robert Ashe and Stephane Jaquemet.

1. Coordination Meeting, Jakarta, 26 March 2003

At the outset of the meeting, the Indonesian Co-Chair (Ms Prianti Gagarin Djatmiko-Singgih) reiterated the informal and information sharing nature of the Coordination Meeting.

The floor was then given to Ambassador John Hayes (New Zealand), the Coordinator of AHEG1. Ambassador John Hayes gave a short briefing on the progress made at the last meeting of AHEG1, held in Colombo (Sri Lanka) on 13-14 March 2003. The most interesting point, as far as UNHCR was concerned, was the fact that Singapore had made the following formal reservation, which they have insisted be incorporated into the final report of the Colombo meeting:

Ambassador Hayes added that Singapore’s view was the most extreme, but that other States were also uneasy about the Bali process shifting too much from combating transnational crimes to mixed flows, secondary movement and refugee protection.

After Ambassador Hayes’ presentation, there were a few interventions from the floor to discuss whether Singapore’s formal reservation meant that the country was dissociating itself from any refugee-related discussion in the context of the Bali process (but accepting that other participants would do it if they wished so) or was adopting a more radical view, i.e. that the Conference itself should be prevented from dealing with refugee issues. The Australian Co-Chair (Ambassador John Buckley) had the feeling that Singapore, having now made its point, would just withdraw from any refugee-related discussion but would neither prevent other participants to raise refugee issues nor be obstructive. This feeling was shared by the other participants, but there was a sense that one of the Co-Chairs should speak in private with the Singaporean delegation to make sure that Singapore had the same understanding as the members of the Coordination Meeting.

Police Major General Krerkphong Pukprayura (Thailand), the Coordinator of AHEG II, briefed the participants on the outcome of the last meeting of the AHEG II, held in Tokyo on 13-14 March. Most of the issues were rather technical and of little relevance to UNHCR. This was followed by a short update by IOM, mainly concentrating on its financial and logistical support to the process.

The next speaker was Michel Gabaudan, who confirmed that the High Commissioner was committed to address the Bali II Conference, unless the events in Iraq and a possible related refugee crisis imposed on him a rescheduling of his meetings. At Bali II, the High Commissioner would naturally be speaking about secondary movement and refugees, as it is his mandate to do so, but he would not seek any formal endorsement of his views by the States in the region. He would express his strongest support to the Bali process and his aim was to be relevant (an "added value") in the context of smuggling and trafficking, A UNHCR paper would also be distributed to the participants. The paper would contain concrete proposals about and responses to secondary movement and mixed flows. The paper would not be Bali II-specific (and would also be circulated in other fora),but would address some of the core issues related to the Bali process. As such, the paper would be of interest to participants in Bali II, and UNHCR would welcome feedback from States. After updating the participants on the Workshop on Best Practices in Asylum Management organized by UNHCR in Bangkok on 10-12 March 2003, Michel Gabaudan asked two specific questions to the floor:

1. When and how should UNHCR’s paper be circulated? Ahead of the Bali II Conference or during the Conference? Who should circulate it?
2. What is the impact of Singapore’s reservation on the High Commissioner’s presence at the Bali II Conference?

The Australian co-chair’s view was that UNHCR, as a full participant in the Bali process, could share with other participants a paper, which could be provided as an "information paper" (i.e. a paper without formal recommendations). Both Co-Chairs and the Coordinator of AHEG1 would work on finding the proper mechanism to distribute it, but the overall consensus appeared to be that UNHCR should address the paper to the Co-Chairs with a request that they distribute it, together with an explanation concerning the status of the paper. As to the timing, it was felt that the paper should be distributed via email as soon as possible and at least two weeks before the Conference.

As to the second question, there was consensus that it was unlikely that Singapore’s views would impact on the presence of the High Commissioner.

The last briefing was made by the new APC Coordinator. At the end of the session, the participants discussed very briefly the agenda, the elements of the Co-Chairs’ statement and the future of the Bali process. The Co-Chairs emphasized that there was consensus among States that Bali was a useful process that needed to be continued, but very little agreement on how to, and who would, ensure a proper follow-up. UNHCR pointed out that the draft elements of the Co-Chairs’ statement contained an error as it spoke about "criminalizing illegal migration" under AHEG2, whereas the draft report of AHEG2 spoke about criminalizing people smuggling and trafficking. This was acknowledged by the Co-Chairs and changes made to the draft.

In many respects, the Preparatory Meeting, which was attended by over 120 participants representing 31 countries and 3 international or regional organizations (IOM, APC and UNHCR) and which had an agenda similar to the Coordination Meeting, confirmed some of the problems already identified during the Coordination Meeting. The following are the ones that are relevant to UNHCR:

1. Singapore reiterated its opposition to mixed flows and refugee issues being discussed in the context of the Bali process. Thailand made a similar reservation and asked its reservation to be incorporated into the final report of the Colombo meeting. Malaysia did not make such a formal reservation, but expressed its support for Singapore’s views, mentioning that "Bali should refrain from talking too much about refugees". Finally, China, in a more nuanced and ambiguous way, expressed its support for Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia’s position.
2. A number of countries (Bangladesh, China, Iran) insisted on the non-binding character of the Bali process.
3. While most of the delegations expressed their support for the Bali process, there were conflicting views as regards the way ahead and the follow-up to Bali II. While Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and some of the small Pacific States were in favor of a proper continuation of the Bali process, other States (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam) made it clear that they were against any institutionalization of the post-Bali process, which would have to be absorbed by existing mechanisms (Interpol, ASEAN, etc.). There was lip service, but little support (mainly Australia, Thailand and Papua New Guinea) for the idea of APC as a candidate to house the Bali process (while Singapore, Malaysia and to a lesser extent China expressed their reservation about APC).
4. The elements of the Co-Chairs statement for Bali II were discussed. The final draft (still to be worked out by the Co-Chairs) will be State-control oriented, with little space made for humanitarian concerns (mixed flows, refugees, victims of traffickers and smugglers), mainly because like-minded States might have been afraid of further antagonizing States with a strong border control agenda The only item which may give some room for maneuvering to UNHCR will probably be "addressing root causes". Some breathing humanitarian space can also be found in the work plan adopted by AHEG1, which contains some of UNHCR concerns.
5. In general, the meeting in its entirety was disappointing. Most statements lacked vision and enthusiasm and it was obvious that many States were only moderately committed to the process and its follow-up.

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1. There are obvious pros and cons to the High Commissioner’s presence at Bali II. Among the pros, we can list:

1. In spite of its shortcomings, the Bali process is an important platform or forum where UNHCR concerns could be voiced;
2. The question of smuggling and trafficking is particularly relevant and is inter-related - whether China, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand like it or not - to secondary movement, mixed flows and refugee protection;
3. It is a golden opportunity to meet some 30 ministers of key - often difficult from a refugee protection viewpoint - countries;
4. A last minute withdrawal could be politically damaging.

As to the cons, we can mention:

1. UNHCR has obviously been marginalized in the process and its concerns are not reflected in the Co-Chairs Statement and the draft programme of Bali II;
2. The Bali process may well be short lived, given the lack of enthusiasm of a number of countries;
3. The reservations made by China, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand was not counter-balanced by expressions of support from the part of other States (the like-minded Australia and New Zealand did not dare to be vocal on the issues, probably because of the way they are sometimes perceived in Asia);
4. The High Commissioner’s intervention will need to be seen by States as offering a solution to the problem rather than making their life more difficult. The challenge of being at the same time principled and flexible is compounded by the present climate (States are very emotional about everything related to their sovereignty) in the region. To find the right tone might well be an impossible task.

3.2 On balance, we feel that there are more advantages than disadvantages in the High Commissioner coming to Bali II. Apart from the possibility of speaking in private and in a closed session to Ministers of a number of important countries, a statement by the High Commissioner which (a) recognises the concerns of States in tackling issues of people-smuggling, trafficking and related transnational crime, and (b) positions UNHCR as part of the solution in assisting States to manage asylum-seekers, who form a small portion of migration movements, would go a long way towards making UNHCR relevant in the region, as well as seeking to preserve the asylum regime, albeit often non-formalised in many countries, for those in genuine need of international protection.

3.3. If UNHCR wants to prepare and distribute a paper on secondary movement, the paper should be sent to the Co-Chairs, for further distribution to the participants, not later than two weeks ahead of Bali II. A last minute distribution would be seen as manipulative and insulting by some States. UNHCR needs to be fully transparent and not give the impression that it has a hidden agenda.

3.4. All UNHCR offices in the Asia and Pacific region will need to "sell" the paper and UNHCR's position to their government counterparts involved in the Bali process ahead of Bali II. Proper lobbying and networking will be needed.

RO Jakarta

RO Canberra

28.03.2003